Decoding New Delhi's Strategic Calculus in Manipur: Ethnic Bias or Frontier Geopolitics?

February 19, 2026
Rupam Deodhai Boruah

A Kuki mother and her young daughter mourn at the grave of her husband, a victim of the ethnic violence in Manipur.

Ethnic Bias or Frontier Geopolitics?

The Trigger: How the 2023 Manipur Conflict Escalated

On May 3, 2023, large-scale violence erupted in Manipur following a “Tribal Solidarity March” organized in Churachandpur by the All Tribal Students’ Union Manipur (ATSUM). The march protested an April 2023 directive by the Manipur High Court asking the state government to consider including the Meitei community in the Scheduled Tribe (ST) list.

For many in the Kuki-Zo community, the ST demand represented more than a question of affirmative action. Hill districts in Manipur are constitutionally protected from land transfer to non-tribals. Granting ST status to the valley-dominant Meiteis would potentially enable land acquisition in these areas. 

Kuki-Zo civil society groups framed the demand as an existential issue. Meitei organizations, however, argued that ST status was necessary to preserve cultural identity and secure constitutional protections.

The violence that followed exposed deep fault lines- competition over land, demographic anxieties, insurgent legacies and distrust in state institutions. It has resulted in displacement, casualties, and the effective physical separation of valley and hill populations (Relief Commissioner Data, Government of Manipur, 2023–2024).

 The Allegation of “Favoritism” Toward the Kuki-Zo

Since 2023, sections of Meitei civil society and some Naga organizations have accused New Delhi of disproportionately accommodating Kuki-Zo political demands.

The political sequence intensified these suspicions:

Sequence of political events after the ethnic violence in Manipur

On February 9, 2025, Chief Minister N. Biren Singh resigned amid continued unrest . On February 13, 2025, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs imposed President’s Rule under Article 356 of the Constitution .

President’s Rule remained in place until February 4, 2026, when a new BJP-led coalition government was sworn in under Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh .

The new cabinet attempted ethnic balancing featuring the Chief Minister from the Meitei and two Deputy Chief Ministers- one from the Kuki-Zo and another from the Naga community. The Cabinet expansion is expected shortly, with a total cap of 12 members including the Chief Minister and two Deputy Chief Ministers.

As of February 19, 2026, the government is operating with an initial core of five members and the inclusion of at least two more Kuki-Zo representatives is a central part of the ongoing negotiations in New Delhi.

Critics in Imphal’s valley described this as “overcompensation”  to Kuki-Zo community, Supporters framed it as damage control.

 Policy Decisions Fueling the Perception

 1. Appointment of a Northeast Adviser:

On February 5, 2026, the Ministry of Home Affairs appointed retired Intelligence Bureau officer Ajit Lal as Northeast Adviser.

The timing — one day after the new state government took office — raised questions in Manipur political circles. Critics argue the post creates a parallel communication channel between New Delhi and hill leadership. The Centre has described the appointment as an administrative coordination measure.

2. Suspension of Operations (SoO) and a Possible Autonomy Framework:

Since 2008, multiple Kuki insurgent groups have operated under a Suspension of Operations(SoO) agreement with the Government of India (Tripartite SoO Agreement, 2008; Revised Ground Rules, 2023).

Sources familiar with negotiations indicate that discussions are ongoing regarding a territorial administrative authority model. Observers have drawn comparisons with the proposed Frontier Nagaland Territorial Authority (FNTA) framework .

If implemented, such a model could:

• Create an autonomous territorial council
• Enable direct fiscal transfers from the Centre
• Reduce Imphal’s administrative oversight in designated districts

Meitei organizations fear this would be a de facto step toward territorial fragmentation. Central officials have not publicly confirmed the structure of any such draft agreement yet.

 3. The “German-Tiger” Road Controversy:

The Controversial German-Tiger Road

Meitei and Naga organizations allege that:

• The road crosses contested land
• Expansion violated environmental norms
• The route may facilitate cross-border smuggling

The National Green Tribunal reportedly ordered a halt to expansion activities . However, enforcement has been inconsistent, further fueling perceptions of selective restraint.

Approx 343 km long German-Tiger Road passing through ecologically sensitive zones.

4. Medical Airlift and Symbolic Politics:

 In February 2026, Kuki-Zo MLA Vungzagin Valte was airlifted to New Delhi for advanced treatment after injuries sustained during the ethnic violence (MHA Briefing Note, Feb 2026).

Kuki-Zo MLA Vungzagin Valte airlifted from Imphal Airport to New Delhi in an air ambulance on Sunday, February 6, 2026

While the action was humanitarian, Meitei activists questioned why similar high-level interventions were not publicly visible for displaced Meitei civilians in valley buffer zones.

 In polarized environments, optics become policy signals.

Strategic Realism or Ethnic Alignment?

The Geopolitical Context

The Kuki-Zo are part of the larger Zo ethnolinguistic family spanning-

 • Manipur and Mizoram (India)

 • Chin State (Myanmar)

 • Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh)

This transnational linkage intersects with India’s strategic priorities - Act East Policy and border security.

 1. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor Factor:

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor provides Beijing overland access to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar as part of the Belt and Road Initiative .

Myanmar’s post-2021 instability has reshaped borderland control dynamics. Chin resistance forces against pro-China military Junta Government have gained territorial influence in areas adjoining India’s northeast .

Some analysts argue that India’s engagement with Kuki-Zo actors enhances New Delhi’s leverage along this frontier, indirectly countering Chinese strategic depth.

 2. Insurgent Safe Havens in Sagaing:

 Myanmar’s Sagaing Region has historically hosted multiple Northeast insurgent groups, including:

• United Liberation Front of Assam (Independent)

• National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang-YA)

• United National Liberation Front

 If Chin-aligned forces exert greater territorial control in adjacent Myanmar areas, India’s security calculus shifts.

 A strengthened Kuki-Zo political arrangement inside Manipur could align with efforts to-

 • Disrupt insurgent logistics

 • Limit Chinese influence

 • Prevent cross-border sanctuaries

3. The Kaladan Corridor:

India’s strategic connectivity project — the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project — links Kolkata to Myanmar’s Sittwe port and onward to Mizoram.

Instability along Manipur’s frontier risks jeopardizing broader “Act East” connectivity goals undermining corridor security .

From this perspective, stabilizing Kuki-majority border regions may serve corridor security rather than ethnic preference.

Strategic Realism or Ethnic Preference?

Allegations of favoritism toward the Kuki-Zo community rest on- Continued SoO engagement, Autonomy discussions, Cabinet restructuring, Administrative appointments, High-visibility humanitarian interventions.

Yet when examined against- Cross-border insurgent geography, Chinese infrastructure expansion, India’s Act East framework, Frontier stabilization imperatives an alternative interpretation emerges - New Delhi may be prioritizing territorial security and cross-border leverage over intra-state ethnic equilibrium.

At present, there is no publicly available evidence demonstrating an official policy of ethnic alignment. Nor is there transparent documentation disproving the perception of disproportionate accommodation.

Whether this strategy reduces violence — or entrenches division — remains an open question.